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Abstract
Currently there are no Internet access authentication
protocols available that are lightweight, can be car-
ried over arbitrary access networks, and are flexible
enough to be re-used in all the likely future ubiqui-
tous mobility access contexts. This article proposes
the PANA/UMTS authentication protocol for het-
erogeneous network access as a step towards filling
this gap. A security analysis of the PANA/UMTS
protocol is also provided. This article aims primarily
at contributing to the design of authentication proto-
cols suitable for use in future heterogeneous Internet
access environments supporting ubiquitous mobility.
Keywords: authentication, heterogeneous net-
work access, ubiquitous mobility, UMTS, PANA.
1 Introduction
It is expected that future IP devices will use a vari-
ety of network access technologies to support ubiqui-
tous connectivity. For example, one future require-
ment identified by the SHAMAN1 Project is to pro-
vide flexible security means for accessing heteroge-
neous mobile networks, including not only UMTS [1],
GPRS [10] and GSM [28], but also WLAN [12], Blue-
1http://www.ist-shaman.org/
tooth2, and other network technologies. Moreover,
“heterogeneous network access control security” re-
ceived the highest rating value in the list of open
research issues for future mobile communication sys-
tems produced by the PAMPAS Project [13, p65].
Currently there are no authentication protocols avail-
able that are lightweight, can be carried over arbi-
trary access networks, and are flexible enough for use
with all the various access technologies likely to be
deployed to support future ubiquitous mobility. Fur-
thermore, existing access procedures need to be made
resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks; they also
do not provide non-repudiation. In addition to be-
ing limited to specific access media (e.g. 802.1aa [15]
for IEEE 802 links), some of these protocols are lim-
ited to specific network topologies (e.g. PPP [25] for
point-to-point links) and are not scalable.
The recent IETF PANA (Protocol for carrying
Authentication for Network Access3) work aims to
provide a protocol [11] that will be a flexible and
scalable network-layer authentication carrier for ac-
cess networks that support IP. PANA will be capa-
ble of transporting any EAP (Extensible Authentica-
tion Protocol) method [5] to enable access authen-
tication. In addition, the EAP/AKA protocol [2]
specifies a way of encapsulating the Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Authen-
tication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism [1]
2www.bluetooth.com
3http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pana-charter.html
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within EAP. Once inside EAP, the UMTS param-
eters can thus be carried by PANA. In this paper
we present a proposal for combining UMTS authen-
tication with EAP/AKA and PANA, which we call
PANA/UMTS.
The goal of the PANA/UMTS protocol is to pro-
vide an IP compatible, lightweight, flexible and scal-
able authentication method that allows a client to
be authenticated in a heterogeneous network access
environment. The proposal adapts the security tech-
niques used in UMTS to the PANA structure. The
protocol runs between a client device and an agent
device in the access network, where the agent may
be a client of an AAA (Authentication, Authoriza-
tion and Accounting) infrastructure, which itself has
an interface to the UMTS network.
Section 2 summarises the UMTS network access
security feature, Section 3 describes the EAP/AKA
protocol, and Section 4 explains the PANA proto-
col. Section 5 then describes the proposed new
PANA/UMTS authentication scheme. Section 6
analyses the threats to the PANA/UMTS protocol,
Section 7 considers its advantages and disadvantages
and, finally, Sections 8, 9, and 10 present possible
further work, conclusions and acknowledgements.
2 UMTS Network Access Secu-
rity
UMTS is a third generation mobile communica-
tion standard developed by 3GPP (Third Genera-
tion Partnership Project4). UMTS network access
security provides users with secure access to UMTS
services, protecting in particular the UMTS radio ac-
cess network (UTRAN). This section summarises the
four UMTS network access security features relevant
here, i.e. entity authentication, signalling integrity,
user traffic confidentiality, and user identity confi-
dentiality. Further details of UMTS security can be
found in [1, 4, 28].
UMTS mutual entity authentication involves the
4http://www.3gpp.org/
Mobile Station (MS), the visited network (VN), and
the home network (HN); the VN verifies the sub-
scriber’s identity by means of a challenge-response
mechanism, while the MS checks that the VN has
been authorised by the HN. A 128-bit secret key K
is shared by the USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity
Module) and the HN AuC (Authentication Centre).
An authentication vector is produced by the AuC
from K and a sequence number, and sent on demand
to the VN. The authentication vector contains a ran-
dom number RAND, a network authentication token
AUTN, an expected result XRES, a temporary in-
tegrity key IK, and a temporary cipher key CK.
Whenever the VN wishes to authenticate the
MS, it sends it one (RAND, AUTN ) pair. The MS
verifies AUTN, using K and the sequence number
in AUTN. If this process is successful, the USIM
sends RES, computed as a function of K and RAND,
back to the VN and also computes IK and CK. The
VN then compares the received RES with the stored
XRES, and if they agree the MS is deemed authentic;
IK and CK can then be used for connection security,
as described below.
Signalling data integrity and origin authentica-
tion is provided by computing an integrity check us-
ing the 128-bit key IK, shared by the MS and the
VN. User traffic confidentiality is similarly provided
by encrypting traffic using the 128-bit key CK. The
user traffic confidentiality feature extends to the Ra-
dio Network Controller (RNC), so that microwave
links between the Base Stations and the RNC are
also protected.
Finally, UMTS provides user identity confiden-
tiality through the use of temporary identities. Apart
from at initial registration, a user is not identified em-
ploying his permanent identity IMSI (International
Mobile Subscriber Identity), but instead uses a tem-
porary identity known as the TMSI (Temporary Mo-
bile Subscriber Identity5). To avoid user traceabil-
ity, which may lead to the compromise of user iden-
tity confidentiality, temporary identities are changed
regularly in an ‘unlinkable’ way. In addition, it is
5It is TMSI in the circuit switched domain, and P-TMSI in
the packet switched domain.
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required that any signalling or user data that might
reveal the user identity is encrypted when sent across
the UTRAN.
3 An EAP Mechanism for Car-
rying UMTS/AKA
The EAP/AKA protocol [2] is an EAP mechanism for
authentication and session key distribution that uses
UMTS AKA [1]. It involves a client acting on behalf
of a user, an authenticating party and an EAP server.
The EAP server is the network element that termi-
nates the EAP protocol [5]. It may be co-located with
the authenticating party, although the EAP server is
typically implemented on a separate AAA server with
whom the authenticating party communicates using
an AAA protocol. The EAP server, which normally
belongs to the user’s home Internet AAA network, is
able to obtain authentication vectors from the sub-
scriber’s HN AuC.
The EAP/AKA uses two round trips to mutually
authenticate the client and the network, and provide
them with temporary shared secret keys. The pro-
tocol includes exchange of EAP-Request/Response
messages of types Identity and AKA. The type AKA
also has a subtype field that admits the values:
Challenge, Authentication-Reject, Synchronization-
Failure, Identity, and Notification. The subtype-
specific data is composed of parameters encapsulated
in attributes. The EAP/AKA packet format and the
use of attributes are specified in Section 6 of [2]. Ei-
ther the IMSI or the TMSI can be employed as part
of the user identifier. Section 4 of [2] describes user
identity management.
In the EAP/AKA full authentication proce-
dure, an identity request/ response message pair is
first exchanged. Next, the EAP server sends an
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message. This mes-
sage contains a random number (AT RAND), a net-
work authentication token (AT AUTN), and a Mes-
sage Authentication Code (AT MAC) computed on
the EAP packet; it may optionally contain encrypted
data (AT ENCR DATA) for identity confidentiality
support. The client runs the AKA algorithm (usu-
ally inside a USIM) and verifies AUTN and MAC.
If this is successful, the client is talking to a valid
EAP server. It then derives the RES and the tempo-
rary keys, and sends back the EAP-Response/AKA-
Challenge, protected by another AT MAC. The EAP
server then checks the AT MAC, compares the re-
ceived RES with the stored XRES, and if they agree
the user is deemed authentic; the shared temporary
keys can now be used.
The EAP/AKA keying material is generated
from a Master Key (MK), which is calculated using
the hash function SHA-1 [18] from a combination of
the user identity, the UMTS integrity key IK, and
the UMTS confidentiality key CK. The material de-
rived from the MK is subsequently used to generate
the temporary keys. This includes the Master Session
Key (MSK ) for encryption of the traffic between the
client and the network, the encryption key (K encr)
to be used with AT ENCR DATA, and the authen-
tication key (K aut) to be used with AT MAC. Fi-
nally, EAP/AKA includes optional identity privacy
support, and an optional re-authentication proce-
dure.
4 Protocol for carrying Au-
thentication for Network Ac-
cess (PANA)
This section briefly introduces the draft PANA proto-
col [11], a link-layer agnostic transport for EAP to en-
able client-to-network access authentication. PANA
runs between a PaC (PANA Client) and a PAA
(PANA Authentication Agent) situated in the ac-
cess network, where the PAA may optionally be a
client of an AAA infrastructure. PANA carries any
authentication mechanism that can be specified as
an EAP method (e.g. EAP/AKA), and can be used
on any link that supports IP. The header of every
PANA packet contains two sequence numbers to pro-
vide ordered delivery of EAP messages: one trans-
mitted sequence number (tseq), and one received se-
quence number (rseq). The payload of any PANA
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message consists of zero or more Attribute Value
Pairs (AVPs), e.g. a cookie AVP, used for making an
initial handshake robust against ‘blind DoS attacks’
[11], a MAC AVP, protecting the integrity of a PANA
message, or an EAP AVP, which transports an EAP
payload.
Two important features of PANA, namely the
security association (SA) and re-authentication, are
now described. Once the EAP method has com-
pleted, a session key (e.g. the EAP/AKA MSK ) is
shared by the PaC and the PAA. The session key is
provided to the PaC as part of the EAP key exchange
process, and the PAA can obtain the session key from
the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure (if used).
PANA SA establishment based on the EAP session
key is required where no physical or link layer security
is available. Two types of re-authentication (or fast
reconnection) are supported by PANA. The first type
enters the chosen EAP method (e.g. EAP/AKA) at
the authentication phase, where the initial handshake
phase can be omitted. If there is an existing PANA
SA, PANA auth messages carrying the EAP fast re-
connection process can be protected with a MAC
AVP. The second type is based on a single protected
PANA message exchange without entering the au-
thentication phase. If there is an existing PANA SA,
both PaC and PAA can send a PANA reauth request
to the communicating peer and expect the peer to
return a PANA reauth answer, where both messages
are protected with a MAC AVP.
5 PANA/UMTS Authentica-
tion Procedure
The PANA/UMTS mechanism proposed here in-
volves three functional entities, namely the PaC (also
referred to here as the client, user or subscriber), the
PAA (or authenticating party) and the EAP server.
The PaC is associated with a network device and
a set of UMTS credentials stored in a USIM that
are used to prove the PaC identity for network ac-
cess. A possible implementation of the PaC would
be an Internet access device (e.g. a laptop) with a
PC card inserted in the PCMCIA6 socket, equipped
with a UMTS-enabled USIM card. There are other
possible implementations, e.g. involving the use of a
UMTS Mobile Equipment (ME, e.g. mobile phone)
equipped with a USIM card and linked to a laptop
(e.g. via cable, Bluetooth, infrared or WLAN)7.
The PAA authenticates the UMTS credentials
provided by the PaC and grants network access. In
the context of this article, the EAP server is imple-
mented on the AAA server and has an interface to
the UMTS network, operating as a gateway between
the Internet AAA network and the UMTS AKA in-
frastructure. The PAA is thus an AAA client that
communicates with the user’s EAP server through an
AAA protocol supporting EAP (e.g. Diameter EAP
[14]) and key wrap (e.g. Diameter CMS [7], where this
involves encrypting a content-encryption key using a
key encrypting key). PANA/UMTS also involves a
further entity, namely the EP (Enforcement Point),
which may be co-located with the PAA, which ap-
plies per-packet enforcement policies (i.e. filters) to
the traffic of the PaC’s devices.
Figure 1 shows the PANA/UMTS full authen-
tication procedure, which has three main phases:
(1) Discovery and initial handshake, (2) Authen-
tication and (3) Authorization. In the Discovery
phase, an IP address for the PAA is identified, and a
PANA/UMTS session is established between the PaC
and the PAA, following the PANA model (see sub-
section 4.2 of [11]). In the Authentication phase, the
main focus of this article and further explained below,
EAP/AKA messages encapsulated in PANA/UMTS
are exchanged between the PaC and the PAA. At
the end of this phase, a PANA SA is established, in-
cluding the provision of a shared secret EAP/AKA
session key (MSK ); we call this the PANA/UMTS
SA. During the Authorization phase, a separate pro-
tocol is used between the PAA and the EP to man-
age the PaC network access control. After this phase,
the established PANA/UMTS session as well as the
6Personal Computer Memory Card International Associa-
tion (www.pcmcia.org/).
7An alternative described in [16] is to use USIM Toolkit
commands, which enables the USIM to request the ME to
open an infrared or Bluetooth channel with the user laptop.
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Figure 1: PANA/UMTS full authentication
procedure. The name of each message is shown,
followed by the contents of the message in round
brackets. Square brackets are used to denote optional
fields.
PANA/UMTS SA is deleted, following the PANA
standard (see subsection 4.5 of [11]).
During the Authentication phase, the first
PANA auth request message (a) issued by the PAA
encapsulates an EAP-Request/Identity payload. The
PaC responds (b) with a PANA auth answer, which
carries an EAP-Response/Identity payload including
the user identifier Id. After receiving the user identity
from the PAA through an AAA interaction, the EAP
server obtains from the UMTS network the user’s au-
thentication vector, which is further used for deriving
the temporary keys (c).
The next PANA auth request message (d) is-
sued by the PAA includes the EAP-Request/AKA-
Challenge packet that contains RAND, AUTN,MAC,
and an optional AT ENCR DATA (see Section 3).
On receipt of this message, the PaC runs the AKA
algorithm inside a USIM, calculates a copy of AUTN
and MAC, and verifies that these calculated values
equal the received ones8. After that, it derives RES
and the EAP/AKA temporary keying material (e)
for further use.
If all checks out, the PaC responds (f) with a
PANA auth answer message transporting the EAP-
Response/AKA-Challenge payload, which includes
RES and MAC. After receiving this payload from
the PAA by means of an AAA interaction, the EAP
server compares the received RES with the stored
XRES obtained from the authentication vector; if
they agree, the PaC is deemed authentic. As a re-
sult, the EAP server sends back (g) the EAP-Success
packet, which carries the derived keying material. Fi-
nally the PAA encapsulates the EAP-Success packet
in a PANA bind request message sent to the PaC
(h), and receives back an acknowledge through a
PANA bind answer (i). Both PANA bind messages
are protected by a MAC AVP; they may optionally
contain a Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if
link-layer or network-layer encryption should be ini-
tiated after PANA/UMTS. They are also used for
binding device identifiers of the PaC and the PAA,
via Device-Id AVP, to the PANA/UMTS SA estab-
lished at the end of the authentication phase.
6 Security Analysis
In this section, security threats to the proposed
PANA/UMTS protocol are considered.
6.1 User Identity Confidentiality
PANA/UMTS includes user identity confidentiality
support, which protects the privacy of the user iden-
tity against passive attacks (e.g. eavesdropping). But
the mechanism cannot be used on the first connection
with a given PAA, when the permanent user identity
will have to be sent in clear. In this case, an active
8If the MAC does not match, the PaC silently ignores
the previous message and does not send any authentica-
tion results to the PAA. If the AUTN does not match,
the PaC then sends back to the PAA an explicit error
packet (EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject) inside a
PANA auth answer message.
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attacker that impersonates the access network may
learn the subscriber’s permanent identity. However,
the PaC can refuse to send the cleartext permanent
user identity to the PAA if it believes that the access
network should be able to recognize its pseudonym.
If user identity confidentiality is required and the
PaC and PAA cannot guarantee that the pseudonym
will be maintained reliably, then an external secu-
rity mechanism, such as the Protected Extensible Au-
thentication Protocol (PEAP) [20], may be used to
provide additional protection. Nevertheless, this kind
of tunnelling mechanism can itself introduce new se-
curity vulnerabilities, as described in subsection 6.2.
6.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Care has to be taken to avoid man-in-the-middle at-
tacks arising when tunnelling is used, e.g. when using
PEAP, or when EAP/AKA is part of a sequence of
EAP methods. Such vulnerabilities can arise (see,
for example, Asokan et al. [3]) even when the au-
thentication protocols used at the various ‘levels’ are
in themselves secure. When such attacks are suc-
cessfully carried out, the attacker acts as an interme-
diary between a PaC victim and a legitimate PAA.
This allows the attacker to authenticate successfully
to the PAA, as well as to obtain access to the net-
work. As a solution to the problem, Asokan et al. [3]
and Puthenkulam et al. [23] suggest to cryptograph-
ically bind the session keys of the two phases, i.e. to
bind together the tunnel session key and the MSK
derived from the EAP/AKA method. Even when
tunnelling or an EAP sequence of methods are not
used with PANA/UMTS, user data need to be in-
tegrity protected on physically insecure networks to
avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and session hijack-
ing.
6.3 Mutual Authentication
PANA/UMTS provides mutual authentication via
the UMTS AKA mechanisms. The PaC believes that
the PAA is authentic because the network sent cor-
rect MAC and AUTN values. The PAA believes
that the PaC is genuine because the received RES
agrees with the stored XRES, and the MAC com-
puted on the challenge response is correct. Moreover,
PANA/UMTS validates the EAP AVP exchanges
through its PANA message validity check scheme
(Section 4.1.6 of [11]).
6.4 Key Derivation
PANA/UMTS supports 128-bit key derivation
through the EAP/AKA key hierarchy. The tempo-
rary keys for protection of the EAP/AKA payloads
and the MSK are cryptographically separate; i.e. an
attacker cannot derive any non-trivial information
from K encr or K aut based on the MSK or vice
versa. An attacker also cannot calculate the pre-
shared secretK from IK, CK, K encr, K aut orMSK.
6.5 Service Theft, Brute-Force and
Dictionary Attacks
PANA/UMTS does not specify any mechanism for
preventing service theft. Therefore an attacker can
gain unauthorized access to the network by steal-
ing the service from another user, spoofing both the
IP and MAC addresses of a legitimate PaC to gain
unauthorized access. In a non-shared medium, ser-
vice theft can be prevented by simple IP address and
MAC address filters. In shared links, filters are not
sufficient to prevent service theft as they can easily
be spoofed (as described by Parthasarathy [21]). A
recent draft [22] describes how an IPsec9 SA can be
established to secure the link between the PaC and
the EP, which can be used to prevent service theft in
the access network.
The effective key length in PANA/UMTS is 128
bits, and there are no known computationally feasible
brute-force attacks. Because PANA/UMTS is not a
password protocol, it is not vulnerable to dictionary
attacks, assuming that the pre-shared secret is not a
weak password.
9http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html
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6.6 Integrity, Replay Protection and
Confidentiality
The protection of signaling packet exchanges through
the PANA/ UMTS SA prevents an opponent from
acting as a man-in-the-middle adversary, from ses-
sion hijacking, from injecting packets, from replaying
messages, and from modifying the content of the ex-
changed messages. Also, as with all PANA methods,
in PANA/UMTS an integrity object is defined, sup-
porting data-origin authentication, replay protection
based on sequence numbers, and integrity protection
based on a keyed message digest.
Moreover, in PANA/UMTS some attributes are
used to provide integrity, replay protection and con-
fidentiality for EAP/AKA payloads. In this case,
integrity protection is based on a keyed MAC [17]
(i.e. AT MAC). Confidentiality (AT ENCR DATA
and AT IV) is based on the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) block cipher [19]. On full authenti-
cation, replay protection for the EAP/AKA payload
is provided by the underlying UMTS AKA scheme,
which makes use of the RAND and AUTN values.
For EAP based re-authentication, a counter and a
server nonce is used to provide replay protection.
The contents of the EAP-Response/Identity payload
exchanged by PANA/UMTS are implicitly integrity
protected by including them in key derivation.
6.7 Negotiation Attacks, Fast Recon-
nection and Generation of Ran-
dom Numbers
EAP method downgrading attacks might be possi-
ble because PANA/UMTS does not protect the EAP
method negotiation, especially if the user employs the
EAP/AKA identifier with other EAP methods. Nev-
ertheless, the EAP document [5] describes a practice
to avoid attacks that negotiate the least secure EAP
method from among a set. If a particular peer needs
to make use of different EAP authentication methods,
then distinct identifiers should be employed, each of
which identifying exactly one authentication method.
Anyway, some protection against such an attack can
be offered by repeating the list of supported EAP
methods protected with the PANA/UMTS SA.
PANA/UMTS does not support EAP/AKA pro-
tocol version negotiation or ciphersuite negotiation.
In line with Section 4, PANA/UMTS supports
two types of fast reconnection. Since fast reconnec-
tion does not involve the entire AAA communication,
it gives performance benefits. A PANA/UMTS im-
plementation needs to use a good source of random-
ness to generate the random numbers required in the
protocol10.
6.8 Denial-of-service Attacks
PANA/UMTS sequence numbers and cookies provide
resistance against blind resource consumption DoS
attacks, as described in [11]. But PANA/ UMTS does
not protect the EAP/AKA method exchange itself.
Since in particular the PAA is not allowed to discard
packets, and packets have to be stored or forwarded
to an AAA infrastructure, a risk of DoS attacks re-
mains. Also PANA/UMTS adopts the EAP/AKA
mechanism, which is not a tunnelling method. Hence
an adversary can both eavesdrop on EAP/AKA pay-
loads and inject arbitrary messages, which might con-
fuse both the PaC and the PAA. In physically inse-
cure networks, an attacker may mount DoS attacks
by sending false PANA/UMTS success or failure indi-
cations. However, the attacker cannot force the PaC
or the PAA to believe successful authentication has
occurred when mutual authentication failed or has
not happened yet.
The PANA/UMTS protocol also enables both
the PaC and the PAA to transmit a tear-down mes-
sage [11]. This message causes state removal, a stop
to the accounting procedure, and removes the in-
stalled packet filters. Thus such a message needs to
be protected to prevent an adversary from deleting
state information and thereby causing DoS attacks.
10See [8] for details on generating random numbers for secu-
rity applications.
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6.9 Minimal Trust Relationship and
Cipher Key Distribution
The use of authentication vectors is an significant
UMTS feature that permits delegation of authentica-
tion as well as cipher key distribution from the home
to the visited network through a minimal trust rela-
tionship between operators. That is, the home net-
work does not need to reveal the information most
sensitive, such asK, to any intermediate entity in the
visited network. Another benefit with this scheme is
that subsequent authentications do not require addi-
tional round trips with the home network, and this
gives a big performance advantage. This kind of tech-
nique encapsulated into EAP/AKA and carried by
PANA/UMTS can be useful to address heterogeneous
network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. In
particular, in the scenario where a user’s access de-
vice wishes to access the Internet via different mul-
tiple access media and network interfaces11, leading
to the use of a number of network operators. In this
scenario, if we use PANA/UMTS, the home AAA
server can make use of authentication vectors to del-
egate PaC authentication function to the PAA in the
visited network, achieving therefore minimal trust re-
lationship between home and visited network opera-
tors as well as performance benefit. Furthermore,
the same authentication vectors distribution scheme
can include cipher keys to any network access point
implementing a PAA, e.g. a NAS (Network Access
Server), wishing to establish an encrypted channel
with a PaC.
6.10 Mandatory Integrity Protection
versus Mutual Authentication
We can imagine a feasible scenario where the interface
between the client and the NAS is wireless and the
NAS must use a signalling message, such as a start
encryption command, to activate the encryption in
the air interface. In this case, beyond the use of the
authentication vectors material, the introduction of
mandatory integrity protection for critical signalling
11E.g. PPP [25], Bluetooth, IEEE 802.1aa [15].
messages in PANA/UMTS through the MAC AVP
and the AT MAC attribute is crucial to avoid the
typical masquerading or ’false entity in-the-middle’
attack, of which prevention could not be achieved
solely by mutual authentication. Thus, the manda-
tory integrity protection mainly for critical signalling
messages is another feature from PANA/UMTS that
provides significant contribution for authentication in
heterogeneous network access.
7 Advantages and Disadvan-
tages
In this section, the PANA/UMTS proposal is as-
sessed with respect to how well it addresses security
issues arising in future heterogeneous network access
scenarios supporting ubiquitous mobility. The main
advantages of PANA/UMTS in this context are as
follows:
• PANA/UMTS is implemented using PANA, a
flexible and scalable network-layer access au-
thentication protocol. Such a protocol is neces-
sary when link-layer authentication mechanisms
are either not available or not able to meet the
overall requirements, or when multi-layer au-
thentication is needed.
• PANA/UMTS is based on the EAP/AKA
method. This method enables the use of the ex-
isting AKA infrastructure in a number of new
scenarios involving devices that already contain
a USIM. For example, it can be used as a se-
cure PPP authentication method or else in the
context of WLANs and IEEE 802.1aa technol-
ogy, through EAP over wireless. PANA/UMTS
is also not vulnerable to brute force or dictio-
nary attacks and, with the exception of the PaC
first connection to PAA, it includes user identity
confidentiality.
• The PANA/UMTS SA prevents man-in-the-
middle attacks, session hijacking, packets in-
jection, message replay and content modifica-
tion of the subsequent exchanged packets. The
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PANA/UMTS integrity object supports data-
origin authentication, replay protection based on
sequence numbers and integrity protection.
• PANA/UMTS provides ordered delivery of mes-
sages with sequence numbers, which along with
cookies provides resistance against blind DoS at-
tacks. PANA/UMTS also provides confidential-
ity of the EAP/ AKA payload based on a block
cipher.
• PANA/UMTS supports two types of fast recon-
nection, resulting in performance benefits. Use
of UMTS authentication vectors provides min-
imal trust relationship between operators and
also performance benefit. Adoption of manda-
tory integrity protection for critical PANA/
UMTS signalling messages avoids masquerading
attacks.
The disadvantages of the proposed
PANA/UMTS protocol are as follows:
• Although the PANA/UMTS identity payload is
implicitly integrity protected, the PaC first con-
nection to PAA is not benefited by the user iden-
tity confidentiality mechanism.
• PANA/UMTS does not specify any mechanism
for preventing service theft, either for support-
ing ciphersuite or EAP/AKA version negotia-
tion. On the other hand, because PANA/UMTS
is just a signaling protocol and does not carry
user data traffic, in fact it does not have to for-
mally specify any mechanism for preventing ser-
vice theft. However, since EAP/AKA has key
derivation functionality, it is possible to boot-
strap IKEv2 [9] from PANA/UMTS to establish
a local IPsec tunnel for providing both cipher
suite negotiation and service theft prevention.
• Risk of DoS attacks through false EAP/AKA
Success/Failure indications and tear-down mes-
sages. Nevertheless, the EAP document [5]
describes a way to discard false success mes-
sages, and PANA/UMTS supports protected
tear-down messages by using a MAC AVP.
Thus False EAP Failure is the only remain-
ing problem. For example, the client will ac-
cept false EAP Failure in response to EAP Re-
sponse/Identity carried by PANA/UMTS.
8 Further Work
The session key derivation procedure in the cur-
rent version of PANA/UMTS depends heavily on the
EAP/AKA protocol. Therefore one interesting al-
ternative may be to adopt one of the unified EAP
session key derivation approaches currently being in-
vestigated (see, for example, Salowey and Eronen
[24]), instead of adopting the existing scheme from
EAP/AKA, compliant with Section 5 of [26]. An
analogous scheme to PANA/UMTS would be to spec-
ify the GPRS GMM authentication protocol [10] as
an EAP method (e.g. Buckley et al. [6]), enabling its
use with PANA. Another interesting new application
would be the transport of public key based authenti-
cation protocols by EAP (e.g. Tschofenig and Kroe-
selberg [27]) and PANA.
9 Conclusions
According to the PAMPAS Project [13, p135], “the
increasing heterogeneity of the networking environ-
ment is one of the long-term trends which requires
new security approaches. The main challenges in-
clude the investigation and development of unified,
secure and convenient authentication mechanisms
that can be used in different access networks”. Au-
thentication and key agreement are the central com-
ponents of secure access procedures for heterogeneous
network access supporting ubiquitous mobility.
In this paper, we have proposed the new
PANA/UMTS protocol, in order to provide an IP
compatible, lightweight, flexible and scalable method
for authenticating a user to an access network. The
protocol is based on PANA, a network-layer ac-
cess authentication protocol carrier, which communi-
cates, via EAP, with a AAA infrastructure interact-
ing with a UMTS AuC. PANA/UMTS is also based
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on EAP/AKA, which permits to use the AKA in-
frastructure in new network scenarios comprising de-
vices equipped with a USIM. PANA/UMTS prevents
man-in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking, packets
injection, message replay, content modification and
blind DoS attacks. It imposes data-origin authen-
tication, replay protection based on sequence num-
bers and integrity protection. Beyond to support
user identity and EAP/AKA payload confidentiality,
it uses a 128-bit key length and is not vulnerable to
brute-force or dictionary attacks.
The use of authentication vectors in
PANA/UMTS provides minimal trust relation-
ship between operators and no additional round
trips with the home UMTS network, thereby
increasing the likelihood of successful use. The
protocol, from the user’s point of view, works with
a ‘standard’ UMTS USIM card and requires only an
appropriate Internet access device and a USIM card
reader, integrated to or separated from that device.
The gains of performance due to the two types of
fast reconnection, and the gains of security due to
the PANA/UMTS SA may make the PANA/UMTS
proposal attractive to all the UMTS operators
willing to offer to their users heterogeneous Internet
access in ubiquitous mobility networks.
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